We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insu cient information revelation and ine cient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently proÿtable. We also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms. Our analysis of the "contrary of adverse selection" (competition between principals with common value and exclusivity) is suitable for other markets (lawyers, doctors, mechanics, etc.).
Introduction
Experts like lawyers, doctors, mechanics or coaches, combine knowledge of the state of their art and of its application to the particularities of their customers. Expert's skill in this kind of relationship has more weight on the right decision than hidden information the consumer may possess. Above all, many experts are not only selling information but also the derived commodities or services, which increases the con ict of interest they face.
This article considers competition between informed principals (experts) with common value and exclusivity. We show the reasons why competition does not ensure perfect revelation of information to consumers, why, even if market interactions reveal information, the allocation may remain ine cient, and ÿnally why part of the surplus may remain in the hands of some ÿrms.
We put a general argument in insurance terms, but similar features would emerge in other markets where the experts advise and sell. Other applications only require that the cost to the provider and the preferences of the customer both depend on the same hidden parameters (common value) and that the customer has access to one provider only at the same time (exclusivity).
Adverse selection is recognized as a serious threat to insurance markets, but empirical evidence of its existence is scarce (see Puelz and Snow, 1994) . The very success of insurers' classiÿcation methods certainly explains to a large extent the paradox that adverse selection is both feared and hardly visible. This is the point made by Chiappori and SalaniÃ e (2000) . Though their results cannot be generalized to the whole insurance industry, 1 we have to consider seriously the possibility that the risk predictors insurers use for fear of adverse selection might be more precise than customers'.
This view could be dismissed as unrealistic in markets where individual factors are essential, such as in life and health insurance, but the risks covered by the insurance industry are extremely varied. Every example is controversial, but companies specialized in the insurance of activities where damages are rarely experienced can reasonably be expected to better anticipate the possible ÿnancial consequences of an accident. For instance, in liability insurance, up-to-date knowledge of the jurisprudence is required and most clients are not really aware of the compensations they could be forced to pay.
This paper provides a counterpoint to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . In this model, insurers are assumed to know precisely the structure of their clientele in terms of risks, tastes and beliefs, so as to be able to establish classes of clients and to practise price discrimination. The right given to insurers to discriminate is based on the idea that every individual is a di erent market.
2 (This is discussed in the presentation of the model and in Section 4.5.) No informational di erence between insurers is assumed. The policyholder does not know whether he is a low or a high risk. Insurers observe, before contracting, the type of the applicant; they make personal o ers simultaneously; the individual is able to interpret o ers as informative signals, and remains free to accept one or to reject them all. A Bayesian equilibrium concept guarantees a consistent understanding of observed actions on the part of the consumer. 3 The common view is that classiÿcation poses problems of distributive justice -higher risks pay more -not of e ciency. 4 The intuition is that competition enables the consumer to exploit the con icting interests of the various providers to get the best information, the most appropriate quality, and the lowest price. Auction theory supports this optimism: In the simple situation where bidding ÿrms are identical in terms of technology and information (so that ÿrst-and second-prices will be identical), an auction ensures e ciency and allows the consumer to overcome his inferior information and to claim all the surplus.
Further, the common view is that competition should result in full revelation of available information (the consumer's type) and ÿrst-best e ciency (full insurance at an actuarially fair rate). This article proves that this is not the case: Types may be pooled, the high-risk consumers may remain without insurance or obtain partial coverage, and proÿts are not always zero.
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The intuition for ine cient though fully informative equilibria is as follows. Consider the case where low-risk individuals are fully and fairly insured while high-risk individuals are not insured at all. Obviously, insurance companies would like to o er full insurance to high-risk individuals since this would be proÿtable and even Pareto improving. On the other hand, individuals can only infer their types from the o ers they receive. Any "claim" by an insurer that the customer is a high risk poses a credibility problem: an insurer would always like to make a low risk think he is a high risk (this increases his willingness-to-pay for insurance), and the consequence is that such statements are not automatically believed. Indeed, assume the consumer believes that he is a low risk with high probability whenever he is o ered anything other than no-insurance by one of the insurers. If he is a low risk, ÿne, competition works well and he gets the ÿrst-best. If he is a high risk, all insurers "o er" him no insurance. Why is this an equilibrium? The consumer's interpretation rule plays a key role: If an individual insurer deviates and o ers him, say, the full insurance contract a high risk deserves, the individual thinks he is a low risk. If he refuses the o er because it is too expensive, deviations are discouraged, and the high-risk customer ÿnishes up uninsured. 6 The key point now is whether individuals believing they have low risk are reluctant to accept contracts suitable for high-risk customers. This depends on the "proximity" between extreme types: If types are very di erent, then contracts that are proÿtable on high risk types may never be acceptable for customers believing they have a low risk with a probability su ciently close to one.
Pooling equilibria (in which no information is revealed) follow a slightly di erent logic. Take a situation where N insurers o er the same contract C to all types. Obviously, this contract must be acceptable for the individual who has not learned his type, and proÿtable on both types. When is this stable? A priori, an individual insurer is tempted to deviate when a low risk shows up by o ering him a better contract: instead of sharing the customer (i.e. earning a large proÿt with probability 1=N only), it would earn a lower proÿt with probability one. Now assume that the consumer concludes that he is a low risk with probability one whenever he observes something else than C being o ered. With these optimistic beliefs, deviations that are accepted by the customer with probability one are not necessarily su ciently proÿtable compared to C, and, consequently, su ciently proÿtable deviations are not accepted. In any case, the allocation is stable. A pooling equilibrium does not always exist, but, surprisingly enough, it can exist with an inÿnite number of insurers. Two conditions have to be met: The low risk must be low enough for willingness-to-pay for insurance to be su ciently low if the consumer is optimistic, and high-risk individuals have to be su ciently more likely for the willingness-to-pay for insurance of the uninformed consumer to be su ciently high.
Related literature: Our work is technically linked with the literature on informed principals and on credence goods. Leaving the initiative to the informed agent is also the core hypothesis of Maskin and Tirole (1992) . The essential di erence is that here, the uninformed party confronts several (rather than one) informed parties. 7 The strategy space used in Maskin and Tirole (1992) is also worth mentioning: the informed party proposes a "mechanism" (a game form), which improves the e ciency of the equilibria. This paper shows that, with multiple principals, this e ect is extremely limited (Section 4.3). In the literature on credence goods (e.g. Wolinsky, 1995; Emons, 1997) , the hidden parameter is a private value, i.e. it only a ects the consumer's willingness-to-pay, not provision cost. Our work can be seen as the common value version of this research area. In Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) , two producers compete in prices, a common feature with our model being that the pair of prices is treated globally as a signal about producers' qualities, which are di erent. In this paper, producers are identical, and we show that it is not a su cient condition for the market to work properly.
The model
A consumer with wealth W incurs the risk of losing a monetary amount d. Initially, the loss probability (the type) is known to the individual and the insurers only up to its distribution in the population. We assume that the consumer is a high-risk type (loss probability p H ) with probability H ¿ 0 and a low-risk type (loss probability p L with 0 6 p L ¡ p H ) with probability L = 1 − H ¿ 0.
8 The average loss probability is denoted by p A ≡ H p H + L p L . The concave VNM utility function of the agent is denoted by u, and the insurers are assumed to be risk-neutral proÿt maximizers.
The insurers are indexed by a set I = {1; 2; : : : ; N }; N ¿ 2. The time structure of the game is as follows:
1. The consumer's type (H or L) is randomly selected. 2. All insurers observe the type, but the consumer remains uninformed. 3. The insurers simultaneously o er contracts. 4. The consumer observes the o ers, updates his priors, and selects exclusively the preferred o er or the reservation contract (no insurance). 5. The loss occurs or not and the accepted contract is implemented.
Let be the contract space (speciÿed later), and let us denote by C i ∈ insurer i's o er. The "interpretation mapping" (or simply the beliefs) of the policyholder maps the set of vectors of o ers N into ({H; L}), the set of probability distributions over types. In fact we can sum up beliefs byp(C • ) ∈ [p L ; p H ] (the perceived risk probability) where C
• ≡ (C i ) i∈I is a vector of o ers. The consumer's weak preference order over that a certain beliefp implies will be denoted by p . Beliefs are endogenous and known to insurers in equilibrium (they anticipate correctly the consequences of their actions on beliefs).
An o er will be a contract actually proposed by an insurer, whereas the allocation will be the (set of) contract(s) actually adopted by the consumer in equilibrium. A contract is (strictly) acceptable for beliefsp if it is (strictly) preferred to no insurance given the beliefs. Similarly, a contract is (strictly) proÿtable on type K(K = H; L) if an insurer earns (strictly) positive proÿt on this contract when it is accepted by a type-K consumer.
The reservation contract C 0 (here the right to remain uninsured) plays a fundamental role, as we shall see. The decision of the individual at stage 4 will respect the following rules: given the revised priors, (a) any contract which is strictly dominated is never taken; (b) if there are two or more optimal contracts, the individual chooses randomly and symmetrically among optimal o ers di ering from no-insurance. In particular, the consumer accepts any o er with probability 1=N whenever all insurers make optimal o ers. Our tie-breaking rule ensures that the individual's strategy is uniquely determined by his beliefs.
We focus our analysis on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in pure strategies. 
Individual markets: In this analysis, each customer is an "individual market". Strictly speaking, this means that there is a di erent equilibrium for every customer, consequently, two individuals with the same initial characteristics (same priors, same risk) may end up with di erent allocations. This assumption is not problematic for very heterogenous markets, like insurance for factories or buildings, or for groups that are hard to target. Indeed, when the technology to reach the members of a group is lacking, public o ers to larger audiences tend to mix members of the group and consumers that insurers would prefer to treat di erently. This may lead insurers to make individual rather than general o ers. Once the functioning of individual markets is well understood, it becomes easier to discuss the notion of public o ers and their consequences. This is done in Section 4.5.
Strategy spaces: Three di erent insurer strategy spaces are investigated: 0 for full insurance contracts, 1 for insurance contracts in the ordinary sense, and 2 for the mechanisms. 12 Finally, 2 is the set of mechanisms (or game-forms) as in Maskin and Tirole (1992) .
We use the following notations with K = H; L or A (for the uninformed average):
(1) C AF K : the actuarially fair(=zero proÿt) full-insurance contract of type K. C max K : the contract extracting maximal proÿt under symmetric information (see Eq. (2)) on type K.
The notions deÿned above are represented in the plane (W N ; W A ) (see Fig. 1 ). "U K " indicates a type-K indi erence curve; " K " indicates a type-K isoproÿt straight line.
Section 3 solves the model for full insurance contracts ( 0 ) and presents the main intuitions and practical implications of our analysis. Section 4 shows the resistance of ine ciencies when insurers' strategies are extended to more general contracts ( 1 ) or mechanisms ( 2 ). We also o er an extension to more than two types of individuals, and discuss the e ects of reÿning beliefs. We discuss the impact of public o ers and of mandatory insurance. The conclusion focuses on insurance regulation and on the testability of the model. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Price competition
Constraining o ers to provide full insurance simpliÿes the exposition, and above all, sets the best conditions for competition to work e ciently: O ers di er only with respect to prices and comparisons are not type-dependent. However, we show that competition does not lead necessarily to equilibria with discrimination (information is not necessarily revealed) and equilibrium proÿts are not systematically zero (the Bertrand logic is not fully e ective). In this section, a full insurance contract will be simply denoted by the contribution c that is charged to the consumer, the indemnity being equal to d. 
Note that c
Discrimination
We study ÿrst equilibria where di erent types are treated di erently. The ÿrst important fact is that the actuarially fair full insurance allocation is always an equilibrium: competition can work. However, other types of equilibria appear, notably those involving the high risk being either exploited (unfair premium), or not insured.
The di erence between the maximum an L would accept to pay (c max L ) and the minimum an H should be charged (c AF H ) is critical, whereas the number of insurers is irrelevant. Moreover the distribution of types ( H and L ) does not matter since the allocation is separating. The di erence between types determines the possible regimes.
The threshold between these two cases is the solution p L of c max L =p H d in which the LHS is an increasing function of p L . A similar argument shows that, for ÿxed loss probabilities p H and p L , we have proÿtable equilibria if risk aversion is high, and only actuarially fair contracts if risk aversion is low. Whenever it is possible that the consumer is not at risk (p L =0 and L ¿ 0), then the contract that the high risk gets may be anything from an actuarially fair contract to a maximal price contract, plus no-insurance.
Competition is harsh and e cient when types are approximately alike (in a subjective sense since risk aversion matters): Even optimistic individuals are not reluctant to accept contracts suited for the high risk. As a consequence, insurers are always encouraged to lower prices to attract consumers. When types are su ciently dissimilar, ine cient or unfair allocations can be stabilized if the individual is overly optimistic o the equilibrium path. Indeed, if the consumer happens to be a high risk, cutting high prices may be misinterpreted as a signal that he is a low risk, which leads him to reject the better o er and remain uninsured. Competition is so strongly hindered that a ÿrm may capture all the rent without being seriously threatened by its competitors.
Uniform pricing
In a pooling equilibrium, each insurer i charges the same price c i * for all types, but two di erent insurers could charge di erent prices (c i * = c j * if i = j). We show that all o ers are identical in a pooling equilibrium -we denote the only o er by c * -and c * is di erent from and preferred to no-insurance. Indeed, the allocation is the same for all types, since they receive the same o ers and make the same choice. Given that whatever his subsequent beliefs, a consumer would accept any o er which is proÿtable and acceptable for the most demanding belief p L , the allocation di ers from no-insurance since competition ensures that type-L agents are not left without insurance. Indeed, an insurer o ering something other than c * would only have to o er a slightly proÿtable contract (c ¿ c AF L ) when the consumer is an L to be better-o . This would break the equilibrium.
Whether or not c * is sustainable is determined by the two following conditions: (a) c * must be proÿtable on all types, and acceptable for the average type (the consumer keeps his priors). This implies p H d 6 c * 6 c is automatically acceptable, therefore each insurer must prefer c * (and earn the proÿt with probability 1=N ) to attracting a type-K consumer for sure with c max L (or less). 13 This implies (c A pooling allocation becomes less proÿtable as the number of insurers increases (point 2). However, the beneÿt of deviating may be very low if L is a very low risk (point 3): The possibility in the consumer's mind that he might be a very low probability type is su cient for a pooling equilibrium to exist. In particular if p L = 0, if the proportion of low-risk consumers is low enough, then whatever N , there are pooling equilibria.
This result has considerable practical importance since, in most insurance markets, people with very low risk do exist; even if they are very few, the consumer may tend to identify himself with them, and non-discriminating strictly proÿtable o ers have to be expected. Both types being proÿtable in a pooling equilibrium, the absence of discrimination indicates the lack of competitive pressure.
Generalization
Whenever o ers di er from full insurance contracts, we observe two types of consequences. First, certain equilibria of price competition disappear because we have extended the possibilities of deviation. Second, new equilibria appear where the consumer receives something other than full insurance. We shall insist more on equilibria that subsist and on the reasons why they subsist. We limit ourselves here to giving a few indications of their appearance. WR: Types are Weakly Related if and only if, at the actuarially fair price of the high risk, marginal insurance is acceptable for belief p L , but not complete
. CR: Types are Closely Related when the actuarially fair full insurance of the high risk is acceptable for belief
(Note that in 0 -price competition -D and WR both correspond to c max L ¡ c AF H .) We have an ordered partition: given p H , it is necessary and su cient to make p L pass from 0 up to p H for passing from regime D to regime WR and then to regime CR; conversely, given p L , it is necessary and su cient to make p H pass from 1 down to p L for passing through the three regimes. See Fig. 2 .
Actuarially fair full insurance for all is always an equilibrium. In regime CR, beliefs do not matter very much and the allocation is relatively e cient: Competition ensures that all types get an actuarially fair insurance. Regime D is particularly interesting: H may get anything (full insurance, underinsurance or overinsurance) provided it is proÿtable and acceptable. Regime WR is an intermediary situation that is particular to competition in contracts: H cannot get a slightly proÿtable contract because there are equally proÿtable contracts that are always acceptable. Consequently, proÿts on H are either zero or above a minimum, depending on the parameters. In general, the quality of coverage may be suboptimal for both types because quality improvements (like cheaper contracts) are misinterpreted and discouraged.
Pooling allocations: A pooling equilibrium allocation of price competition is always an equilibrium allocation of contract competition. Indeed, when all cheaper full insurance contracts are either unattractive for some beliefs or less proÿtable to the ÿrms, then this is also the case for less e cient contracts (underinsurance or overinsurance). In other terms, if we cannot break a pooling with full insurance contracts, then there exist o -equilibrium beliefs such that no other contract breaks the equilibrium. The di erence however is that there are other equilibria in which the contract o ered is not full insurance: for the same reason that discourages cheaper o ers, more e cient o ers can be discouraged.
Competition in menus 16
Competition in mechanisms is hard to tackle directly. Nevertheless we build on the previous results to show why ine ciency persists. To understand the practical meaning of this game, one can see mechanisms in the following way: by o ering a mechanism i , insurer i pre-commits to a short list of allocations {C i j } j∈J , where J is a su cient set of indices (two contracts with di erent indices may be identical); once o er i is accepted, insurer i can impose any of the allocations in {C i j } j∈J to the consumer. Contrarily to the previous strategy spaces, we are not able to propose here a clear-cut typology of the equilibria. Nevertheless, we ÿnd that if types are su ciently dissimilar, proÿtable equilibria exist. Proposition 3. Fix p H and p L and consider a symmetric separating equilibrium of contract competition in which L receives C AF L . We denote by C H the contract received by H (no insurance, a proÿtable contract or a fair contract, depending on type proximity).
C H remains an equilibrium allocation of competition in contracts if p L is decreased
(distance between types is increased). 2. C H becomes an equilibrium allocation of mechanism competition if p L is suciently small (distance between types is su ciently increased). (1992) showed that allowing the principal to o er practically unrestricted mechanisms (or game forms), rather than contracts in the narrow sense, eliminates a certain type of ine ciency. Indeed, in simple models, signalling costs are sometimes higher than strictly necessary, simply because the agent's o -equilibrium beliefs force the principal to pay these costs. By o ering a "menu" in which incentive constraints are binding, the principal himself can eliminate these costs in advance.
Maskin and Tirole
This e ect is limited here. Certain equilibria we ÿnd with price competition and contract competition disappear when menus are allowed, but not all. Indeed, when types are very dissimilar, it remains better not to deviate from proÿtable o ers to H : menus that are attractive to the consumer must o er something attractive to an L (else it su ces that the consumer believes that he is an L when the menu is o ered to see him refuse the menu), but as the o er becomes more attractive to L, it necessarily becomes less proÿtable on H . This discourages deviations.
More than two types
Consider competition in contracts with a "large" type support. We prove that, for any type, the set of allocations he can receive increases when the support of the prior distribution increases. Retrospectively, H and L in the two-type study can be considered as a particular pair of the more general distribution.
We consider a ÿnite support of types denoted by K in which J and K are generic types. Let J and K , the prior probabilities of J and K, be strictly positive. The two-type "conditional game" where the support of the types is restricted to J and K, and where the proportions of the types are, respectively J =( J + K ) and K =( J + K ) exhibits exactly the characteristics we studied in previous sections. We denote the set of equilibrium strategy proÿles of this game by E(J; K). A generic element of this set is denoted by (C 
Remark that (C •

Js ; C
• Ks ) s∈S is not always an equilibrium since two di erent pairs could lead to the same contracts, in which case the restrictions on the beliefs inherited from the two conditional games are con icting. The proposition states that in that case, we can always ÿnd another equilibrium for one of the conditional games such that the ambiguity disappears, the strong result being that this other equilibrium can be chosen as close to the original equilibrium as we may wish.
There are other types of equilibria, e.g. where three or more types are pooled. Pooling allocations need not group types that are close in the support: in a four-type economy, extreme types can form one pooling and intermediate ones another.
The result points to an essential mechanism behind multi-sender games: they entail a high degree of coordination on the public signal (the consumer's type). In consequence, individual insurers taken in isolation have little in uence in general, and often none, on the allocation: They are virtually forced to align their o er with the others', even if certain deviations could be extremely valuable.
Reÿnements
Reÿnements are conceived for eliminating equilibria which are supported by somehow "unreasonable" beliefs. After examining the impact of eliminating discontinuous beliefs, we test existing reÿnements. We simply recall that reÿnements are either focussed on the principals' incentives, or directly concerned with the revelation of information. Readers interested must read Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) for a complete discussion and contributions on this topic.
Continuous beliefs 17 : It is often useful, for the sake of exposition, to show that ine ciencies are preserved because potential deviations are discouraged by discrete 17 We thank a referee for suggesting that we examine this question. e ects on the beliefs. For example, a strictly proÿtable C H in a separating equilibrium could be maintained because a better o er C causes optimistic beliefs that makes even C unacceptable. The question is therefore: are ine ciencies maintained only because of discontinuous beliefs? The answer, we prove, is no.
To deÿne continuous beliefs, we take the Euclidean measure on N 1 (a space of dimension 2N -two states, N insurers).
Proposition 5. If beliefsp(·) are continuous in a symmetric equilibrium (pooling or separating), then any equilibrium o er is either (1) actuarially fair or (2) just acceptable.
In summary, continuous beliefs select extreme allocations in which either insurers or the consumer do not gain from trade.
The second category being more unexpected, we still have to check that the Bertrand logic can be broken in e ect and that the equilibrium o er can be just acceptable and unfair. Take a symmetric allocation in which C H is unfair, and equivalent to C 0 forp = p H (condition 2 in the proposition). For a unilateral deviation C = C 0 , deÿne p(C) as the belief for which C is equivalent to no insurance. Deÿnep(·) such thatp(C; C H ; : : : ; C H ) ¡ p(C) when p(C) ¿ p L andp(C; C H ; : : : ; C H ) ¿ p L . By construction, a deviation by insurer 1 is not acceptable when it is proÿtable and not proÿtable when it is acceptable (the same restriction must be imposed for any other insurer's deviation), andp(·) can be chosen to be continuous.
18 Pooling equilibria are sustained by similar procedures.
Incentive-based reÿnements: In these reÿnements, one starts from the equilibrium allocation and tries to see what types of principal would "gain" from playing a deviation. Beliefs associated should put zero mass on the types that do not gain. Di erent versions of this reÿnement vary as to what "gain" exactly means, namely, what sort of reaction from the part of the uninformed agent should be expected to compute the payo consistently (this has been essentially developed in the principal-agent context). The example that we will develop is the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) , notoriously e cient in many signalling games.
We apply the classical deÿnition 19 as follows: In all equilibria, we verify that the contribution to beliefs of any insurer is "reasonable". Otherwise stated, if C
• * H and C
• * L
18 Our reasoning is still valid if we take Lipschitzian beliefs (which is more demanding than mere continuity), i.e. we can assume that there is a positive number M such that
since p(C) is continuous and Lipschitzian, which implies thatp(·) can be Lipschitzian as well.
19 Take a PBE. Given a type K, some propositions of the insurer would lead it to earn, whatever the subsequent beliefs of the agent provided he acts conditionally on them, a proÿt which is lower (strictly lower for one possible belief at least) than the proÿt it earns by playing its equilibrium action. The intuitive criterion imposes the following restriction: A "reasonable" belief of the agent associated with such a dominated proposition must put zero mass on type K, provided that the proposition gives a higher proÿt than equilibrium proÿt on the remaining type. If the condition is not satisÿed, the equilibrium is eliminated.
are equilibrium vectors of o ers, beliefsp are reasonable if and only if for any i and for any K, beliefsp(C −i * K ; ·) are reasonable as far as insurer i's behavior is concerned.
Proposition 6. A PBE allocation is robust to the Cho-Kreps criterion if and only if (1) it is separating and (2) it assigns the actuarially fair full insurance contract to the low-risk type.
A certain degree of e ciency is reached via the reÿnement. Non-discriminating equilibria are eliminated, as well as ine cient insurance for the low risk in separating equilibria. However, both strictly proÿtable insurance and no-insurance for H are robust.
The failure can be understood as follows. Even if the high risk is not insured whereas the low risk is completely insured at an actuarially fair price, deviations that are favorable to the high-risk consumer (contracts better than no-insurance) are typically favorable to the insurer whatever the agent's real type.
Revelation-based reÿnements: This category is speciÿc to multi-principal environments. The idea is that in a given equilibrium, vectors of o ers for di erent types are typically di erent in more than one dimension. The consequence is that no principal's o er is essential for interpreting correctly the message: Any short list of o ers (even one o er only) is su ciently informative in most equilibria. Each insurer is tempted to free-ride the revelation part, and attract the consumer with the best deal. However, notice that the reasoning is valid ex post only, i.e. too late in a pure PBE. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) proposed that equilibrium beliefs should be unprejudiced in the following sense.
20; 21 To each vector of o ers, they associate two numbers: The ÿrst (resp. the second) is the number of o ers di erent from the equilibrium o ers assigned to the high-risk (resp. the low-risk) type. If these two numbers di er, the belief associated with the examined pair should put probability one on the type corresponding to the strictly smaller number. Applied to our model, their reÿnement selects as a unique separating equilibrium actuarially fair full insurance for each type. Indeed, individual insurers do not have in uence on beliefs when they deviate, which means that they can easily propose better contracts without seeing customers ee. However, the criterion is incapable of eliminating pooling equilibria.
Combining reÿnements: The intuitive criterion is useful against pooling equilibria whereas the Bagwell-Ramey criterion is useful against ine cient separating equilibria. There is another di erence. With the intuitive criterion, the dimension of the contract space is crucial for the arguments based on incentives. Applied to price competition, the criterion is incapable of eliminating pooling equilibria. With unprejudiced beliefs, the dimension of the contract space is irrelevant.
Applying both arguments sequentially (the order does not matter) leads to the unique allocation that the market would have reached under symmetric information: actuarially fair full insurance for each type. We must however bear in mind that the implicit informational and cognitive assumptions are largely obscure, which is a common (and valid) objection against reÿnements.
Public o ers
Our analysis is focused on individual markets. In markets where people with similar characteristics form large identiÿable groups, insurers could post-target public offers. Pooling equilibria, we have shown, are necessarily proÿtable on both types. Now suppose that types are independently distributed in the group. If, through a public o er, an insurer commits to sell insurance at slightly better conditions to anyone from the group, then people should not update their beliefs and should accept this o er. This would be mutually advantageous for the deviating insurer and consumers.
22
In fact, there is no unique way to introduce groups and public o ers in the model nor a unique way to adapt Bayesian revision rules. For example, types could be correlated in the group (there is no compelling reason why draws by Nature should be independent), to the point that all members are either H or L. (Public causal factors like criminality rates, jurisprudence, climatic evolution, etc., are ready examples where correlation is likely.) In that case, the individual analysis recovers its strength: The public o er can still be interpreted by the group as a signal that they are better than average, and they all prefer to remain uninsured.
These two extreme situations aim at proving that the analysis of group o ers requires several additional assumptions on the statistical relationship between the members, and on the kind of sophistication we want to put in their beliefs. A full clariÿcation of the issue is left for further research.
Mandatory insurance
The analysis provides a rationale for mandatory insurance. Consider a pooling equilibrium. An o er that is slightly better for all beliefs always exists (it su ces to increase the indemnity by a small amount), and will necessarily be preferred, to the proÿt of the deviating insurer. Taken to its logical conclusion, this eliminates all pooling in equilibrium, because no insurer would accept losses on high-risk consumers. Proÿts are therefore necessarily zero, and allocations are separating and actuarially fair. However, the improvement is not complete since overinsurance for L or underinsurance for H is possible. Denote by C H L the optimal insurance contract for an H that is actuarially fair for an L (this contract o ers overinsurance to L). We show now that C H L is an equilibrium allocation for L. Indeed, if when one insurer at least o ers another fair contract than C H L thenp = p H , then the equilibrium is necessarily C H L . This proves that the optimal coverage is not warranted by mandatory insurance.
Conclusion
Competition on individual markets does not ensure perfect revelation of information to consumers, and even when market interactions reveal information, the allocation may remain ine cient. The irony is that the largest rents to the ÿrms are left by the most distrustful consumers, those who refuse to admit they have the costly type, until they ÿnish -too late -with an ine cient lot. As reÿnements indicate, sophisticated consumers are better treated by the market: Educating the public's understanding of insurance, not to say of competition, is likely to produce desirable e ects. The e cacy of education-based policies is even stronger when risks change faster than regulations.
Regulating discrimination in insurance markets is particularly di cult. Ex ante, all equilibria of our game are worse than the allocation that would emerge under symmetric ignorance of the types (namely, average fair full insurance). We encounter a variety of the Hirshleifer paradox, where the value of the insurers' superior information is socially negative. 23 The tragedy is that better rating techniques are always sought because they enable the insurer to attract selectively, and proÿtably, the lower risk consumers. Even if, sooner or later, imitation undermines the informational advantage, search for better rating threatens the status quo, whatever it is. Moreover, if anti-discrimination laws could break this dynamic, the danger would come from the other side: Adverse selection (better informed consumers) can suddenly become an issue, and the very laws that protect the consumer against useless discrimination become an obstacle to e ciency.
The easiest tests of our theory are based on predictions which do not contradict our model but which falsify that of Rothschild and Stiglitz, and the symmetric information hypothesis. In the absence of a quantitative argument, we suggest that the following statements are reasonably attractive:
(1) low-risk people may be better covered by insurance than high-risk people; (2) certain people are not insured in spite of their above average riskiness; (3) in certain niches, policyholders are persistently proÿtable.
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Notice that our statements are not ceteris paribus. We base our analysis on the fact that two people may be observationally di erent for the insurers and the econometrician, and still not be aware of the extent of their di erences in riskiness. Compared to the tests of adverse selection, this imposes a di erent treatment of control variables. In theory, the most complete view of insurance markets lies between extremes: both parties have private information and menus signal information from insurers to individuals whereas individuals reveal information to insurers by their choices. Whether 23 Pooling equilibria in our model are less favorable to the individual since they entail positive proÿts on both types. In the separating equilibria, even the best case where each type is fully insured according to its actuarial value, the individual receives ex ante less utility than with the uninformative, average fair, full insurance. Indeed, the uninformed risk-averse consumer does not want to incur the risk of paying a price that depends on his type, especially because the average price remains the same. 24 These consequences di er from "proselection" (better risks are better covered) as deÿned in Hemenway (1990) , since one suspects that individuals there are better informed. He showed that careless people (those who do not fasten their seat belts) tend to have adopted less insurance coverage. The data were collected at a car rental company by direct observation. the structure of asymmetric information is close to one of the extremes (adverse selection or better informed insurers) is an empirically challenging question. Given that in practice, insurers o er menus in which consumers make their choices, but menus are not the same for all individuals (see Puelz and Snow, 1994; Chiappori and SalaniÃ e, 2000) , econometricians have to control for the exact nature of o ers and classiÿcation techniques in order not to assess asymmetric information where there is none.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
We prove that if all insurers o er C H to H (o ering a single contract is a mechanism), then we can ÿnd beliefs such that no mechanism is an attractive deviation. We show that this is possible if p L is su ciently small.
For all ∈ 2 , all K; K( ) denotes the allocation that assigns to K. We distinguish two cases (a) L( ) makes a proÿt strictly higher than max L on L if accepted, and (b) L( ) makes a proÿt lower than max L on L, if accepted. We check now that the following beliefs sustain the equilibrium allocation (no-insurance for all): if (a) then consumer believes he is an L; if (b) then he believes he is an H .
(a) would break the equilibrium only if L( ) were strictly preferable to no-insurance for belief p L . This is impossible.
(b) breaks the equilibrium only if (i) H ( ) is strictly preferable to no-insurance for belief p H (the value of for the individual is the value of H ( )), (ii) H ( ) is strictly proÿtable on H (the insurer has to be induced to deviate) and (iii) more proÿtable than L( ) on H (incentive compatibility). Without loss of generality, K( ) can be seen as a random allocation of insurance contracts: the mechanism works as if K( ) were specifying the random rules according to which (W N ; W A ) were allocated. Let us deÿne˜ as the insurance (ordinary) contract (E(W N |H ( )); E(W A |H ( ))). Due to the insurer's risk neutrality and the consumer's risk aversion, if breaks the equilibrium, then (i)˜ is also strictly preferable to no-insurance for belief p H , (ii)˜ is also strictly proÿtable on H , and (iii) still more proÿtable than L( ) on H . Therefore˜ (hence H ( )) necessarily generates strictly positive proÿts on L. On the other hand, incentive compatibility ensures that L( ) is more proÿtable than H ( ) on L, otherwise stated, proÿts on H ( ) are necessarily bounded above by a certain H (p L ) that tends towards zero as p L tends towards zero. This means that the deviation becomes necessarily unattractive as p L gets smaller, and the equilibrium is not broken. Other cases. Assume that one of the conditions above is violated, e.g. C , the modiÿed o ers still support a pooling equilibrium. We are back to the base case.
(b) If J s and J s were both low risks in their conditional games, they would receive actuarially fair o ers in separating allocations. But J s = J s , therefore their vectors of o ers would be su ciently di erent. This proves that one type, say J s to ÿx ideas, is the high risk in "his" conditional game. The set of equilibrium allocations for J being a continuum, 25 the o ers he obtains can be slightly changed to approximate C
• Js and eliminate ambiguity. We are back to the base case.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 6
(1) Take a symmetric pooling equilibrium. We denote the proposed contract by C * , and by * H and * L the associated proÿts ( * K = K (C * )=N ). Deÿne C as the barycenter of C 0 (weight N − 1) and C (weight 1); we have K (C) = * K =N for any K. The VNM utility functions being quasi-concave, C is necessarily strictly acceptable for belief p H (C 0 and C * are acceptable for belief p A ), and strictly better than C * . Following the CK logic, in the neighborhood of C, the angular sector in which H (·) that is acceptable, better than the equilibrium o er, and strictly proÿtable. This eliminates unfair or ine cient allocations to L. We cannot go further. Considerp(C −i * H ; ·). Whatever C i o ered by i that would improve its proÿt on H , C i would not decrease its equilibrium proÿt on L (which is zero). In consequence, beliefs cannot be restricted by the Cho-Kreps criterion and the equilibrium is not eliminated.
